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Abstract
We study in details the turnout rate statistics for 77 elections in 11 different countries. We show that the empirical results
established in a previous paper for French elections appear to hold much more generally. We find in particular that the
spatial correlation of turnout rates decay logarithmically with distance in all cases. This result is quantitatively reproduced by
a decision model that assumes that each voter makes his mind as a result of three influence terms: one totally idiosyncratic
component, one city-specific term with short-ranged fluctuations in space, and one long-ranged correlated field which
propagates diffusively in space. A detailed analysis reveals several interesting features: for example, different countries have
different degrees of local heterogeneities and seem to be characterized by a different propensity for individuals to conform
to the cultural norm. We furthermore find clear signs of herding (i.e., strongly correlated decisions at the individual level) in
some countries, but not in others.
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Introduction
Empirical studies and models of election statistics is a classical
field of Political Economy [1–5]. This subject has attracted
considerable attention in the recent physics literature, see e.g. [6–
16]. In [17], the present authors have studied the statistical
regularities of the electoral turnout rates, based on spatially
resolved data from 13 French elections since 1992. Two striking
features emerged from our analysis: first, the distribution of the
logarithmic turnout rate t (defined precisely below) was found to
be remarkably stable over all elections, up to an election
dependent shift. Second, the spatial correlations of t was found
to be well approximated by an affine function of the logarithm of the
distance between two cities. Based on these empirical results, we
proposed that the behaviour of individual agents is affected by a
space dependent ‘‘cultural field’’, that encodes a local bias in the
decision making process (to vote or not to vote), common to all
inhabitants of a given city. The cultural field itself can be
decomposed into an idiosyncratic part, with short range correla-
tions, and a slow, long-range part that results from the diffusion of
opinions and habits from one city to its close-by neighbours. We
showed in particular that this local propagation of cultural biases
generates, at equilibrium, the logarithmic decay of spatial
correlations that is observed empirically [17].
The aim of the present note is to provide additional support to
these rather strong statements, using a much larger set of elections
from different countries in the world. We discuss in more depth
the approximate universality of the distribution of turnout rates,
and show that some systematic effects in fact exist, related in
particular, to the size of the cities. We also confirm that the
logarithmic decay of the spatial correlations approximately holds
for all countries and all elections, with parameters compatible
with our diffusive field model. The relative importance of the
idiosyncratic, city dependent contribution and of the slow diffusive
part is however found to be strongly dependent on countries. We
also confirm the universality of the logarithmic turnout rate for
different elections, for different regions or for different cities,
provided the mean and the width of the distribution is allowed to
depend on the city size. Overall, our empirical analysis provides
further support to the binary logit model of decision making, with
a space dependent mean (the cultural field mentioned above).
Results and Discussion
Data and Observables
We have analysed the turnout rate at the scale of municipalities
for 77 elections, from 11 different countries. For some countries, the
number of different elections is substantial: 22 from France (Fr,
&36000 municipalities in mainland France), 13 from Austria (At,
&2400 municipalities), 11 from Poland (Pl, &2500 municipalities),
7 from Germany (Ge, &12000 municipalities), while for others we
have less samples: 5 from Canada (Ca, &7700 municipalities), 4
from Spain (Sp, &8000 municipalities in mainland Spain), 4 from
Italy (It, &7200 municipalities in mainland Italy), 4 from Romania
(Ro, &3200 municipalities), 3 from Mexico (Mx, &2400 munic-
ipalities), 3 from Switzerland (CH, &2700 municipalities) and 1
from Czech Republic (Cz, &6200 municipalities). More details on
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 May 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 5 | e36289the nature of these elections and some specific issues are given in
Appendix S1.
For each municipality and each election, the data files give the total
number of registered voters N and the number of actual voters Nz,
from which one obtains the usual turnout rate p~Nz=N[½0,1 .F o r
reasons that will become clear, we will instead consider in the following
the logarithmic turnout rate (LTR) t, defined as:
t : ~ln(
p
1{p
), t[ {?,z?½: ð1Þ
Because we know the geographical location of each city, the knowledge
of t for each city enables us to create a map of the field t(~ r r) and study
its spatial correlations.
Statistics of the Local Turnout Rate
Whereas the average turnout rate is quite strongly dependent on
the election (both on time and on the type of election – local,
presidential, referendum, etc.), the distribution of the shifted LTR
t{StT was found to be remarkably similar for the 13 French
elections studied in [17]. (The notation S...T means a flat average
over all cities, i.e. not weighted by the population N of the city.)
The LTR standard-deviation, skewness and kurtosis were found to
be very similar between different elections. The distribution P(u)
of the shifted and rescaled LTR,
u~
t{StT
s
,w ith s2~St2T{StT
2 ð2Þ
was found to be very close in the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) sense.
We have extended this analysis to the 9 new election data in
France, and to all new countries mentioned above. For France, the
Elections Municipales (election of the city mayor), not considered in
[17], have a distinctly larger standard deviation than national
elections. However, P(u) is again found to be similar for all the
French elections, except the Re ´gionales of 1998 and 2004. These
happen to be coupled with other local elections in half
municipalities, which clearly introduces a bias. The distributions
P(u) for all elections in France are shown in Fig. 1 and compared
to a Gaussian variable. The distribution is clearly non Gaussian,
with a positive skewness equal to &1:1 and a kurtosis equal &4:8.
A more precise analysis consists in computing the KS distances
between each pair of elections. We recall here that a KS distance
of dKS~1 corresponds to a &20% probability that the two tested
distribution coincide, while dKS~1:6 corresponds to a &1%
probability. Removing the Re ´gionales, we find that the KS distance
dKS averaged over all pairs of elections is equal to 1:49, with a
standard deviation of 0:47. These numbers are slightly too large to
ascertain that the distributions are exactly the same since in that
case the average dKS should be equal to
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
p=2
p
|ln2&0:87.O n
the other hand, these distances are not large either (as visually
clear from Fig. 1), meaning that while systematic differences
between elections do exist, they are quite small. We will explain
below a possible origin for these differences.
The same analysis can be done for all countries separately; as
for France, we find that P(u) for different elections are all similar,
except for Germany for which SdKST~3 – see Table 1, where we
show the mean and the standard-deviation of KS distances
between elections of a given country, and of the skewness and
kurtosis of the distributions P(u) in a given country. Note that the
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Figure 1. Probability distribution of the rescaled variable u over all communes for France. A standardized Gaussian is also shown. The inset
similarly shows the probability distribution of the usual turnout rate p. We use the same symbols and color codes for the French elections throughout
this paper.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036289.g001
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other hand, these distributions is clearly found not to be identical
across different countries. Table 2 shows the matrix of KS
distances between countries ‘‘super-distributions’’. (A ‘‘super-
distribution’’ of t of a country is obtained by aggregating the
appropriately shifted LTR distributions over all ‘‘compatible’’
elections. Compatible elections have roughly the same distribution
P(t{StT), i.e. without normalization by its standard-deviation.
They are chosen as follows: for Canada and Poland all elections;
for France all pure national elections (nor combined with local
elections, i.e. all elections apart from Re ´gionales in 1998 and 2004,
and Municipales in 2001 and 2008); for Mexico, Chamber of
Deputies in 2003 and 2009; for Germany Chamber of Deputies in
2005 and 2009; all Chamber of Deputies elections for Austria,
Spain, Italy and Switzerland; and for Romania, all elections apart
from its European Parliament election (see Appendix S1, for more
details).) The values of dKS are all large, except for the pairs
France-Czech Republic, France-Switzerland, Spain-Switzerland,
Spain-Romania and Switzerland-Czech Republic.
In order to understand better these results, one should first
realize that the statistics of the LTR does in fact strongly depend
on the size of the cities. This was already pointed out in [17,18].
For example, the average LTR for all cities of size N (within a
certain interval), that we denote as StTN:mN, is distinctly N
dependent, see Fig. 2 and Fig. S1 in Appendix S1. In most cases,
the average turnout rate is large in small cities and declines in
larger cities, with notable exceptions: for example, the trend is
completely reversed in Poland, with more complicated patterns for
parliament elections in Italy or Germany. Similarly, the standard-
deviation of t, sN, also depends quite strongly on N (see below
Figs. 3, 4, and Fig. S2 in Appendix S1).
However, the distribution QN(v) of the rescaled variable
v~(t{mN)=sN over all cities of size N for each election can be
considered to be identical from a KS point of view, both within the
same country for different N but now also across different
countries, at least when N is large enough (arguments will be
provided below to understand why this should be expected).
For example, the average KS distance between QN(v)
distributions corresponding to different ranges of N in France is
equal to 0:58, with standard-deviation 0:12. These numbers are
respectively 0:72+0:20, 0:58+0:13 and 0:87+0:36 for Italy,
Spain and Germany. (We have excluded the smallest cities,
Nv200, that have a distinctly larger KS distance with other cities
– see below. Bins, ranked according to the municipality size N
contain each around 500 municipalities.) In Table 3, we show for
different bins of N values the mean and standard-deviation KS
Table 1. Mean and standard-deviation of KS distances (dKS) between all pairs of elections within each country.
Country dKS skewness kurtosis Country dKS skewness kurtosis
Austria 1.44+0.54 0.10+0.38 0.53+0.81 Canada 1.23+0.39 20.40+0.39 4.4+0.9
(0.93+0.19) (20.13+0.21) (0.54+0.43) (1.23+0.39) (20.40+0.39) (4.4+0.9)
France 1.49+0.47 1.07+0.15 4.7+1.4 Germany 3.0+1.1 0.48+0.30 1.6+0.9
(1.42+0.45) (1.10+0.14) (5.1+0.9) (0.81) (0.20+0.05) (1.53+0.04)
Italy 0.70+0.09 20.45+0.11 1.01+0.02 Mexico 1.28+0.35 0.32+0.09 1.1+0.8
(0.68) (20.45+0.15) (1.01+0.003) (1.19) (0.35+0.11) (1.6+0.3)
Poland 0.80+0.20 0.12+0.26 0.38+0.42 Romania 1.06+0.39 0.05+0.43 1.5+0.4
(0.80+0.20) (0.12+0.26) (0.38+0.42) (0.95+0.36) (20.14+0.25) (1.6+0.4)
Spain 1.78+0.68 0.27+0.25 1.8+1.1 Switzerland 1.67+0.43 0.51+0.08 1.4+1.4
(1.24) (0.07+0.21) (2.5+1.2) (0.47) (2.9)
Mean and standard-deviation of skewness and kurtosis of distributions of t over all municipalities is also given for each country. In parentheses, the same measures but
restricted to compatibles elections in each country.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036289.t001
Table 2. Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance, dKS, between the ‘‘super-distributions’’ corresponding to different countries.
Ca Cz Fr Ge It Mx Pl Ro Sp CH
At 4.60 3.24 5.01 1.49 1.58 2.31 1.62 1.57 2.43 2.25
Ca 2.45 6.72 7.15 4.62 4.06 6.62 2.78 3.53 1.44
Cz 0.93 4.84 3.65 2.12 3.16 1.94 1.71 0.58
Fr 8.00 6.13 2.18 5.61 2.66 2.28 0.83
Ge 1.73 2.81 2.32 2.85 3.74 2.83
It 3.13 3.12 2.05 3.17 2.58
Mx 1.83 1.95 2.19 1.87
Pl 1.99 2.41 2.06
Ro 0.95 1.39
Sp 1.11
In italic, normal and bold text, respectively dKSw3:0, 1:5vdKSƒ3:0 and dKSƒ1:5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036289.t002
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statistically compatible, at least when N is large enough.
Now, even if QN(v) was really universal and equal to Q   (v),
P(u) would still reflect the country-specific (and possibly election-
specific) shapes of mN and sN, and the country-specific
distribution of city sizes, r(N). Indeed, one has:
P(t)~
X
N
r(N)Q  
t{mN
sN
  
, ð3Þ
which has no reason whatsoever to be country independent. But
since for a given country the dependence on N of mN,sN and
r(N) tends to change only weakly in time, the approximate
universality of P(u) for a given country follows from that of QN(v).
In fact, French national elections can be grouped into two families,
such that the dependence of mN on N is the same within each
family but markedly different for the two families (see next section
and Fig. 5 below). Restricting the KS tests to pairs within each
families now leads to an average KS distance for P(u) of &1:25
with a standard deviation &0:4 (identical for the two families),
substantially smaller than dKS~1:49 from Table 1. This goes to
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responsible for the weak non-universality of P(u) within a given
country.
Zooming in now on details, we give in Table 4 the KS distance
between QN(v) aggregated over all elections of a country and a
normalized Gaussian, for different ranges of N and different
countries. The skewness and kurtosis of the distribution Q   (v) and
the KS distance to a Gaussian, aggregated over all N, are given in
Table 5 for different countries, and aggregated over countries for
fixed N in Table 6. Two features emerge from these Tables:
N While for some countries (Czech Republic, Spain and Mexico)
the deviation of QN(v) from a Gaussian appear small (both
measured by KS or by the skewness and kurtosis), such an
assumption is clearly unacceptable for Italy and Germany, for
which the KS distance is large for all N (see Table 4) and a
substantial negative skewness can be measured. Furthermore,
the aggregated distribution (over all N) is clearly incompatible
with a Gaussian except in the Czech Republic, Spain and
Mexico – see Table 5.
N Table 6 shows an interesting systematic N dependence of the
distance to a Gaussian, which is on average smaller for larger
Ns, and maximum for small cities. This suggests that although
the KS tests is unable to distinguish strongly the QN(v) for
different N, there is in fact a systematic evolution for which we
provide an argument below. In fact, as clearly seen in Table 3,
the average KS distance between the QN of different countries
is also systematically smaller as N increases.
A Theoretical Canvas
In order to delve deeper into the meaning of the above results,
we need a theoretical framework. In [17], we proposed to extend
the classical theory of choice to account for spatial heterogeneities.
A registered voter i makes the decision to vote (Si~1) or not
(Si~0) on a given election. We can view this binary decision
as resulting from a continuous and unbounded variable
Qi[ {?,z?½ that we called intention (or propensity to vote).
The final decision depends on the comparison between Qi and a
threshold value {Wth: Si~1 when Qiw{Wth, and Si~0 otherwise.
In [17], the intention Qi(t) of an agent at time t who lives in a city
a, located in the vicinity of ~ R Ra, was decomposed as:
Qi(t)~i(t)zw(~ R Ra,t)zma(t); ð4Þ
where i(t) is the instantaneous and idiosyncratic contribution to
the intention that is specific to voter i, and w(~ R R,t) and ma(t) are
fields that locally bias the decision of agents living in the same area.
The first field w is assumed to be smooth (i.e. slowly varying in time
and space), as the result of the local influences of the surroundings.
This is what we called a ‘‘cultural field’’, that transports (in space)
and keeps the memory (in time) of the collective intentions. The
second field ma, on the other hand, is city- and election-specific,
and by assumption has small inter-city correlations. It reflects all
the elements in the intention that depend on the city: its size, the
personality of its mayor, the specific importance of the election
that might depend on the socio-economic background of its
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Table 3. Mean and standard-deviation over all pairs of countries of the KS distance dKS between the aggregated QN(v)
distributions in each country, for different values of N.
1000ƒNv2000 2000ƒNv4000 4000ƒNv8000 8000ƒNv16000 16000ƒN
dKS 1.47+0.77 1.38+0.65 0.94+0.48 0.91+0.46 0.95+0.48
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036289.t003
Election Turnout Statistics in Many Countries
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 May 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 5 | e36289inhabitants, as well as the fraction of them who recently settled in
the city, etc. (See [17] for a more thorough discussion of Eq. (4).)
Consider now N agents living in the same city, i.e. with under
the influence of same field values w and m. The turnout rate p is by
definition:
p~
1
N
X N
i~1
Si: ð5Þ
For N sufficiently large, and if the agents make independent decisions,
the Central Limit Theorem tells us that:
p&pz
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
p(1{p)
N
r
j, ð6Þ
where p~P(Qw{Wth) is the probability that the conviction of the
voter is strong enough, and j is a standardized Gaussian noise. If,
on the other hand, agents make correlated decisions (for example,
everybody in a family decides to vote or not to vote under the
influence of a strong leader), one expects the variance of the noise
term to increase by a certain ‘‘herding’’ factor h§1, which
measures the average size of strongly correlated groups. Therefore
we will write more generally:
p&pz
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
hp(1{p)
N
r
j: ð7Þ
Following a standard assumption in Choice Theory [19], we take
the idiosyncratic ’s to have a logistic distribution with zero mean
and standard-deviation S, in which case the expression of p
becomes:
p~
1
1zexp({
wzmzWth
S
)
: ð8Þ
This allows one to obtain a very simple expression for the LTR t:
t~ln(
p
1{p
)&b: wzmzWth ðÞ z
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
h
Np(1{p)
s
j, ð9Þ
where b:1=S. Therefore, in this model, the statistics of t directly
reflects that of the cultural and idiosyncratic fields.
Let us work out some consequences of the above decomposition,
and how they relate to the above empirical findings. Since the
cultural field w is by definition not attached to a particular city, it is
reasonable to assume that w and b are uncorrelated. Without loss
of generality, one can furthermore set SwT~SmT~0. Therefore:
StTN~mN~SbTNWthzSbmTN: ð10Þ
Two extreme scenarios can explain the N dependence of mN: one
is that the dispersion term SbT is strongly N dependent while the
statistics of m is N independent, the other is that b is essentially
constant and reflects an intrinsic dispersion common to all voters
in a population, while the average of the city-dependent field m
depends strongly on the size of the city. Of course, all intermediate
scenarios are in principle possible too, but the data is not precise
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Figure 5. Shifted StTN~mN as a function of N for French
elections. Three families of elections clearly appear. a) Top curves:
‘‘important’’ national elections (Presidential, Referendums, Parliament);
b) Bottom curves: less important national elections (European,
Re ´gionales); and c) Middle curves: Municipales (see text). Each point
comes from the average over around 200 communes of size &N.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036289.g005
Table 4. KS distance between QN(v) and a normalized Gaussian for different ranges of N and for different countries.
Country 1000ƒNv2000 2000ƒNv4000 4000ƒNv8000 8000ƒNv16000 16000ƒN
Austria 2.03 1.82 0.76 0.98 1.58
Canada 3.48 1.09 0.60 0.53 0.59
Czech Rep. 0.63 0.73 0.55 0.37 0.61
France 2.50 2.15 1.18 0.71 0.86
Germany 1.75 2.78 2.55 2.49 3.08
Italy 2.69 3.74 3.11 2.32 0.88
Mexico 1.50 0.79 0.55 0.97 0.48
Poland 0.45 1.45 0.89 1.40 1.20
Romania 1.73 1.48 1.14 0.63 0.92
Spain 0.70 0.83 0.71 0.63 0.69
Switzerland 1.38 1.49 0.65 0.69 0.44
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036289.t004
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effects. Here, we want to argue that the dependence of m on N is
likely to be dominant. Indeed, if the first scenario was correct, one
should observe:
mN~StTN&SbTNWth ð11Þ
The decrease of mN as a function of N would therefore mean that
SbTN itself is a decreasing function of N when the mean LTR is
positive. This is a priori reasonable: one expects more heteroge-
neity (and therefore a larger S, and a smaller b) in large cities than
in small cities. However, the same model would imply a smaller
dependence on N for low turnout rates, and even an inverted
dependence of mN on N for elections with a very low turnover
rate, such that StTv0. This is not observed: quite on the contrary,
the mN dependence is compatible with a mere vertical shift for
similar elections, see Fig. 5.
On the other hand, a model where b is constant, independent of
N and to a first approximation on the election, leads to:
StTN~mN~b WthzSmTN ½  , ð12Þ
which appears to be a good representation of reality. The
dependence of SmTN – the average propensity to vote – on N,
could be the result of several intuitive mechanisms: for example,
voters in small cities are less likely to be absent on election day
(usually a sunday in France); the result of an election is sometimes
more important in small cities than in large cities (for example,
election of the mayor); the social pressure from the rest of the
community is stronger in small cities; all these effects suggest that
the average turnout rate is stronger in small cities. In order to
explain the opposite behaviour (as in Poland), or a non-
monotonous dependence, as in Italy or Germany for parliament
elections, a systematic dependence of b on N might be relevant,
although one should probably dwell into local idiosyncracies.
Figure 5 suggests that in France three families of elections
clearly appear: a) ‘‘important’’ national elections (Presidential,
Referendums, Parliament), for which mN shows a change of
concavity around N~1000; b) less important national elections
(European, Re ´gionales) for which the average turnout is low, for
which the change of concavity is absent; and c) Municipales for
which the variation of mN between small and large cities is the
largest (as can be expected a priori). Note that the difference Dm
between the mean LTR for small and large cities is markedly
different in the three cases: Dm&0:7 in case a), Dm&0:95 in case
b), and Dm&1:65 in case c).
As a first approximation, we thus take b to be constant for all
cities. The standard-deviation of t over all cities of a given size
then writes:
s2
N~b
2 Sw
2TzSm2TN{SmT
2
N
hi
z
h
N
S
1
p(1{p)
TN: ð13Þ
We show in Fig. 3 the quantity s2
N minus the trivial binomial
contribution, i.e. the last term of the right hand side of the above
equation, as a function of N{3=4, for French elections. The
exponent v~3=4 results from the best fit of s2
N (minus the trivial
binomial contribution) as a power law of N{v. As predicted by the
above model, we see that the N?? limit is clearly positive
&0:035+0:05, and to a good approximation independent of the
election – including the Municipales: although the N dependence of
s2
N is found to be markedly different (as N{1=4), this quantity still
extrapolates to the same asymptotic value. If one believes that our
interpretation of w as a persistent cultural field is correct, there is in
fact no reason to expect that s2
w~Sw
2T should change at all from
election to election. The above result is therefore compatible with
the fact that b is to a first approximation election independent, as
already suggested by Fig. 5 above. The same results hold for all
other countries, although the statistics is not as good as in the case
of France: the asymptotic value of s2
N for N?? is only weakly
dependent on the election, and b
2s2
? in the range 0:03{0:12 for
all countries. Furthermore, the N-dependence of s2
N is found to be
roughly compatible with N{v with vƒ1 in all cases. We choose
to plot the results as a function of N{1=2 for all these other
countries, as to suggest that v is in some cases larger than 1=2 (like
for Cz), or less than 1=2 (like for Ge).
If b is constant, the N-dependent contribution of s2
N must come
from the variance of the city-specific contribution m. A simple-
minded model for the statistics of m predicts a variance that should
decrease as N{1. Indeed, a large city can be thought of as a
patchwork of n!N independent small neighbourhoods, each with
a specific value of m. The effective value of m for the whole city has
a variance that is easily found to be reduced by a factor n, and
therefore s2
N!N{1. A weaker dependence of s2
N on N signals the
existence of strong inter-neighbourhood correlations (or strong
heterogeneities in the size of neighbourhoods), that lead to a
Table 5. KS distance (dKS) to a standardized Gaussian, and
low-moment skewness (skew) and kurtosis (kurt) of
aggregated distributions Q   (v).
Country dKS skew kurt
Austria 2.63 20.05 0.15
Canada 2.93 20.75 2.14
Czech Rep. 0.83 20.32 0.30
France 2.55 20.02 0.31
Germany 4.09 20.21 0.05
Italy 5.61 20.67 0.79
Mexico 1.21 0.12 20.06
Poland 2.13 0.18 0.58
Romania 2.36 20.06 1.25
Spain 1.03 20.16 0.41
Switzerland 1.85 0.24 0.88
Data are aggregated over all N for each country.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036289.t005
Table 6. KS distance (dKS) to a standardized Gaussian, and
low-moment skewness (skew) and kurtosis (kurt) of
aggregated distributions Q   (v). Data are aggregated over all
countries for fixed N.
Range of Nd KS skew kurt
1000ƒNv2000 2.25 20.07 0.43
2000ƒNv4000 3.50 20.12 0.44
4000ƒNv8000 2.90 20.12 0.42
8000ƒNv16000 1.74 20.13 0.31
16000ƒN 1.74 20.19 0.43
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036289.t006
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from n!N to n!Nv with vv1 (see [20,21] for a related
discussion). These inter-neighbourhood correlations are indeed
expected, since some of the socio-economic and cultural factors
affecting the decision of voters are clearly associated to the whole
city. Interestingly, these correlations should be stronger for local
elections, which is indeed confirmed by the fact that v is markedly
smaller for the Municipales elections in France. We therefore find
the interpretation of the anomalous N dependence of s2
N as due to
the city-specific contribution m rather compelling.
Let us now turn to the distribution of the rescaled variable v.
Within the above model, and again assuming that b is constant,
one finds that:
v~
t{mN
sN
!b(wzm{SmTN)z
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
h
Np(1{p)
s
j: ð14Þ
The last ‘‘binomial’’ term quickly becomes Gaussian as N
increases, and is at least four times smaller than the first two terms
when Nw1000 (when h~1). Since the cultural field w is, according
to the model proposed in [17], the result of averaging random
influences over long time scales and large length scales, one expects,
from the Central Limit Theorem, that w is close to a Gaussian field
as well. However, the statistics of m has no reason to be Gaussian for
small cities N, for which it reflects local and instantaneous
idiosyncracies, and for which no averaging argument can be
invoked. The ‘‘universality’’ of QN(v) across countries is therefore
probably only apparent, since there is no reason to expect that the
distribution of m is independent of the country. In fact, QN(v) in
countries like Italy, Germany and the Czech Republic do exhibit a
stronger skewness than in other countries. Still, according to the
above discussion, the contribution of different neighbourhoods to m
must average out as N increases, and one expects the distribution of
m itself to become more and more Gaussian as N increases.
To sum up: the random variable v is the sum of three
independent random variables, two of which can be considered as
Gaussian, while the third has a distribution that depends on N and
becomes more Gaussian for large N, with a variance that
decreases as N{v. This allows one to rationalize the above
empirical findings on the distributions QN(v): these are more and
more Gaussian as N increases, and closer to one another for
different countries, since the country specific contribution m
becomes smaller (as N{v) and itself more Gaussian.
It is instructive to compare the relative contribution to the
variance of the turnout rates of the cultural field w on the one hand,
and of the city-specific field on the other. The latter can be obtained
by subtracting from the total variance of the LTR, s2
t,t h e
contribution of the cultural field b
2s2
w which is obtained as the
extrapolation of s2
N to N?? (see Figs. 3 and 4) and the average
contribution of the binomial noise, Sh=Np(1{p)T. The herding
factor h can be estimated using the method introduced in [17],
whichcomparesdifferentelectionsforwhichthebinomial noisesare
by definition uncorrelated (see Eq. (10) of Ref. [17]). The ratio of
r~s2
m=s2
w can be seen as an objective measure of the heterogeneity
of behaviour in country, i.e. how strongly local idiosyncracies can
depart from the global trend. Table 7 gives the ratio r for all studied
countries. Using this measure, we find that the most heterogeneous
countries are Canada and the Czech Republic (although the ratios
forCa,Mx,CzandGemight beoverestimatedbecause thedata did
not allow us to estimate the herding ratio h in these two cases) and
the most homogeneousones areAustria,Switzerland and Romania.
Not surprisingly, however, the largest value of r is found for the
French Municipales, i.e. local elections, for which idiosyncratic effects
are indeed expected to be large. Note also that the herding ratio is
anomalously high for Romania (h~8:5), and quite substantial for
Poland (h~4:7). Finally, it is interesting to notice that the quantity
bsW depends only weakly on the country (it varies by a factor 1:7
between Franceand Italy). Since the total intentionQ is onlydefined
up to an arbitrary scale, one can always set sw~1. Therefore, we
find that the idiosyncratic dispersion 1=b (or the propensity not to
Table 7. Decomposition of the total LTR variance into a cultural field component b
2s2
w, and city-specific component b
2s2
m, and a
binomial component, Sh=(Np(1{p)T, corrected by a herding coefficient h§1.
Country s2
t h vb
2s2
w (N??) b
2s2
w (Eq. 19) Sh=(Np(1{p)T b
2s2
m r~s2
m=s2
w
Austria 0:13 2:91 =20 :09 0:14 0:025 0:015 0:17
Canada 0:2 1b 1=20 :03 NA 0:015 0:155 5:1
Czech Rep. 0:165 NA 1=20 :035 0:035 0:025 0:105 3:
France 0:13 0:8{ 3=40 :035 0:035 0:03 0:065 1:85
France (mun) 0:35 1 1=40 :035 0:035 0:045 0:27 7:7
Germany 0:15 0:? 1=40 :05 0:105 0:01 0:09 1:8
Italy 0:15 2:21 =40 :10 0:10 0:02 0:03 0:3
Mexico 0:27 0:{ 1=20 :1 NA 0:002 0:17 1:7
Poland 0:085 4:71 =20 :035 0:065 0: 0:05 1:4
Romania 0:11 8:51 =20 :07 NA 0:015 0:025 0:36
Spain 0:195 0:7{ 1=80 :06 0:115 0:035 0:10 1:7
Switzerland 0:155 0:6{ 1=20 :065 0:105 0:015 0:075 0:85
This last term is determined using the method proposed in [17], which leads to a herding coefficient h given in the second column. {: when the direct fit gives a value of
h less than unity, we enforce h~1. ?: the case of Germany seems to be special, maybe due to a large fraction of postal votes. : the method to determine h requires
more than one election, and therefore cannot be applied to the Czech Republic. In this case, we also set h~1 by default. b: Missing data prevents us from determining h
precisely, so we again set h~1 by default. The value of the exponent v is only indicative, since in some countries the power-law assumption is not warranted, see Fig. 4.
We give two values for b
2s2
w: one as the asymptotic extrapolation of s2
N{Sh=(Np(1{p)T for N?? and the second from the rescaling coefficient C , see below and
Fig. 9. Both these determinations are only precise to within roughly +20%.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036289.t007
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France, Poland and the Czech Republic, and weakest in Italy and
Austria.
Spatial Correlations of Turnout Rates
Another striking empirical finding reported in [17,18] is the
logarithmic dependence of the spatial correlation of the LTR as a
function of distance. The spatial pattern of the local fluctuations of
the LTR in European countries are shown in Fig. 6. One clearly
sees the presence of long-ranged correlations. More precisely, for
the 13 French elections studied there, one finds that the spatial
correlation of t’(~ R Ra)~t(~ R Ra){mNa (where ~ R Ra is the spatial
location of the city and mN is the average of t over cities of
similar sizes) decreases as:
C(~ r r)~St’(~ R Rz~ r r)t’(~ R R)T&{C0 ln
r
L
, ð15Þ
where L is of the order of the size of the country. We show in Fig. 7
the average C(r) for all French elections (except the two
Figure 6. Heat map of the normalized logarithmic turnout rate
t{mN
sN
, for the 2004 European Parliament election in France,
Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain. Germany had nomenclature reform of their municipalities which make more difficult to efficiently join spatial
data to electoral data. Note the strongly heterogenous, but long-range correlated nature of the pattern. Note also some strong regionalities, for
example in the German regions of Sarre or Bade-Wurtemberg, where the average turnout rate is strong and sharply falls across the region
boundaries. In these cases, the implicit assumption of a translation invariant statistical pattern that we make to compute C(r) is probably not
warranted, and it would in fact be better to treat these regions independently.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036289.g006
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functions for all elections, separately for each country for which
the geographic position of cities is available to us.
Using the above decomposition, and noting that by assumption
the fluctuations of m(~ R R) around the suitable size dependent
average SmTN have short-ranged correlations, one concludes that the
long-range, logarithmic correlations above must come from those
of the cultural field w. One indeed finds:
C(~ r r=0)&Sw(~ R Rz~ r r)w(~ R R)T, ð16Þ
since the other two terms only contribute for~ r r~0. As a consistency
check of this decomposition, one should find that C(~ r r) should quickly
decay from C(r~0) to C(r?0z)&b
2s2
w (e.g. &0:035+0:05 for
France). This is indeed seen to be well borne out, see Fig. 7. The
agreement between two completely different determination of b
2s2
w
(one using the extrapolation of s2
N to infinite sizes, and the second using
C(r)) holds very well for France, Italy and the Czech Republic, and
only approximately for other countries (see Tab. 7 and Fig. 4).
Inspired by a well-known model in statistical physics where
these logarithmic correlations appear, we postulated in [17] that
the field w evolves according to a diffusion equation, driven by a
random noise, which is meant to describe the exchange of ideas
and opinions between nearby cities and the random nature of the
shocks that may affect the cultural substrate. As we argued in [17],
the fact that people move around and carry with them some
components of the local cultural specificity leads to a local
propagation of w(~ R Ra,t). Through human interactions, the cultural
differences between nearby cities tend to narrow according to:
Lw(~ R Ra,t)
Lt
         
infl:
~
X
b
Cab½w(~ R Rb,t){w(~ R Ra,t) , ð17Þ
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Figure 9. Average of spatial correlation, rescaled. Left: Average over numerical simulations of the model (with ‘c~4:5 km) with the true
positions of all cities for each country. Right: Average over real election data for each country. We also shown the average and standard deviation
(coming from different realizations of the noise history g, and plotted as error bars) corresponding to the numerical model for French cities.
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assume to decrease over a distance corresponding to regular
displacements of individuals, say 10 km or so. For concreteness,
we take: Cab(r)~C0e{r=‘c. As is well known, the continuum limit
of the right hand side of Eq. (17) reads DDw(~ R R,t), where D is the
Laplacian and D(~ R Ra)~
1
2
X
b r2
abCab is a measure of the speed at
which the cultural field diffuses. Random cultural ‘‘shocks’’ add to
the above equation a noise term g(~ R Ra,t).
If cities were located on the nodes of a regular lattice of linear
size L, it would be easy to compute analytically the stationary
correlation function of the field w. It is found to be given by a
logarithm function of distance, provided L&‘c:
Cw(r)!ln
L
r
, ‘c%r%L: ð18Þ
However, the spatial distribution of cities in real countries is quite
strongly heterogeneous, which leads to significant deviation from a
pure logarithmic decay. In order to compare quantitatively our
model with empirical data, we have therefore simulated the model
using Eq. (17) with the exact locations of all cities for the different
countries under consideration. The results, averaged over many
histories of the noise term, are shown in Fig. 9-left for ‘c~4:5 km,
(but changing ‘c from 1:5 km to 9 km hardly changes the curves).
Quite remarkably, we see that Cw(r) exhibits a significant
concavity, very similar to what is observed for the empirical
correlations. In order to see that the model is indeed compatible
with observations, we have plotted in Fig. 9-right the empirical
data superimposed with the prediction of the model for the French
case (for which the data is best). The empirical correlation C(r) is
rescaled by a country dependent value C  in order to achieve the
best rescaling. This value of C  allows us to obtain a second
determination of b
2s2
w, through the relation:
b
2s2
w~b
2s2
w
     
Fr:
C   : ð19Þ
Note however that the numerical model predicts a rather large
dispersion around the average result, that comes from a strong
dependence on the noise realisation g(~ R Ra,t). One should therefore
expect that the empirical data (which corresponds to only a few
histories) departs from the average theoretical curve, in a way
perfectly compatible with Fig. 9-right. This also means that there is
quite a bit of leeway in determination of C , which is only
determined to within +20%. Finally, note that the shape of C(r)
for Germany is significantly different, with a pronounced change
of regime around r&70 km. This is clearly related to the strong
regional idiosyncracies that we discussed in Fig. 6.
We conclude that our numerical model reproduces very
satisfactorily the observations for all studied countries (with the
possible exception of Germany, for the reason noted above). This
lends strong support to the existence, conjectured in [17], of an
underlying diffusive cultural field responsible for both the long-
range correlation (in space) and persistence (in time) of voting
habits.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that the empirical results for the
statistics of turnout rates established in [17] for some French
elections appear to hold much more generally. We believe that the
most striking result is the logarithmic dependence of the spatial
correlations of these turnout rates. This result is quantitatively
reproduced by a decision model that assumes that each voter
makes his mind as a result of three influence terms: one totally
idiosyncratic component, one city-specific term with short-ranged
fluctuations in space, and one long-ranged correlated field which
propagates diffusively in space. The sum of these three contribu-
tions is what we call the ‘‘intention’’. A detailed analysis of our
data sets has revealed several interesting (and sometimes unex-
pected) features: a) the city-specific term has a variance that
depends on the size N of the city as N{v with vv1, suggesting
strong inter-city correlations; b) different countries have different
degrees of local heterogeneities, defined as the ratio of the variance
of the city-dependent term over the variance of the cultural field; c)
different countries seem to be characterized by a different pro-
pensity for individuals to conform to a cultural norm; d) there are
clear signs of herding (i.e. strongly correlated decisions at the
individual level) in some countries, but not in others; e) the
statistics of the logarithmic turnout rates become more and more
Gaussian as N increases.
Although we have confirmed the existence of a diffusive
cultural field using election data from different countries, we feel
that more work should be done to establish the general relevance
of this idea to other decision making processes. It would be
extremely interesting to find other data sets that would enable
one to study the spatial correlations of decision making. An
obvious candidate would be consumer habits – for example the
consumption pattern of some generic goods, or the success of
some movie, etc.
Finally, we believe that our detailed analysis of the statistics of
turnout rates (or more generally of election results) reveals both
stable patterns and subtle features, that could be used to test for
possible data manipulation or frauds, or to define interesting
‘‘democracy’’ indexes. In that respect, the existence of strong
herding effects in some countries is somewhat disturbing.
Materials and Methods
Appendix S1, gives more information about the set of (public)
electoral data studied in this paper. Most of them can be directly
downloaded from official websites (see References in Appendix
S1). Part of the database used in this paper can also be directly
downloaded from [22].
Average values and standard-deviations do not take into
account extreme values in order to remove some electoral errors,
etc. Electoral values greater than 5 sigma are not taken into
account. For instance let 100 municipalities of size &N (as in
Fig. 2), each one has a LTR ti (i~1,2,:::,100). First, StT and S are
the average value and the standard-deviation of t over these 100
municipalities. Next, the final average value mN and the final
standard-deviation, sN, over this sample of 100 municipalities are
uniquely evaluated for municipalities, i, such that Dti{StTDv5 s.
Supporting Information
Appendix S1 Details on the data sources and more figures.
(PDF)
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